Capital structure decisions of european and U.S. listed firms: is there a unique financial theory? by Serrasqueiro, Zélia et al.
Research and Applications in Economics Volume 2, 2014                                                                                          www.seipub.org/rae 
  1 
Capital Structure Decisions of European and 
U.S. Listed Firms: Is there a Unique Financial 
Theory? 
Zélia Serrasqueiro*1, Márcia Rogão2, Paulo Macãs Nunes3 
*1Management and Economics Department of Beira Inteiror University, Portugal 
2 Márcia Rogão, Instituto Politécnico Bragança, Portugal 
3 Management and Economics Department of Beira Inteiror University, Portugal 
*1zelia@ubi.pt; 2mrogao@ipb.pt; 3macas@ubi.pt 
 
Abstract 
This study seeks to verify if financial theories are  mutually 
exclusive in explaining the capital structure decisions of 
European and U.S. listed firms. To achieve the main 
objective of this study, for the period between 1996 and 2007, 
a research sample of 659 listed firms made up as follows is 
taken into consideration: 92 German, 78 Spanish, 95 French, 
91 Italian, 76 Dutch, 45 Portuguese, 91 British and 91 U.S. 
firms. As method of estimation, we use panel data models, 
namely the GMM System (1998) and LSDVC (2005) dynamic 
estimators. The results obtained show that for all the listed 
firms in Europe and the U.S., the existence of a negative 
relationship between profitability and debt is in accordance 
with the assumptions of Pecking Order Theory. Furthermore, 
the negative relationship between liquidity and debt also 
suggests that European and U.S. listed firms follow the 
principles of Pecking Order Theory in their capital structure 
decisions. However, the results also show that European and 
U.S. listed firms follow the Dynamic Trade-Off Theory 
seeking to adjust, albeit with different speeds, the level of 
current debt towards the target debt ratio. 
Keywords 
Capital Structure Decisions; European Listed Firms; Panel Data 
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Introduction 
The debate on the subject of firms’ capital structure 
originated in the work of Modigliani and Miller (MM, 
1958), is based on a set of assumptions underlying the 
context of a perfect capital market, concluded on the 
irrelevance of capital structure for the firm’s market 
value. The work by MM (1958) does  not provide a 
realistic description on how firms finance their 
activities, but it lets us find the reasons related to the 
importance of financing for firms. 
The assumptions in the work of MM (1958) have been 
questioned in the vast financial literature, which is 
embodied in Trade-Off Theory, Agency Theory, 
Pecking Order Theory, Market Timing Theory, and 
other theories on capital structure. Frank and Goyal 
(2008) suggested dividing Trade-Off Theory into two 
distinct perspectives: the perspective of Static Trade-
Off Theory and that of Dynamic Trade-Off Theory. 
The main difference between the two perspectives lies 
in the fact that Static Trade-Off Theory put the 
emphasis of its analysis of the subject of optimal 
capital structure on a single period of time. According 
to Dynamic Trade-Off Theory, firms’ capital structure 
decisions are based on a partial adjustment of the 
current level of debt towards the target debt ratio 
(Ozkan, 2001; Bhaduri, 2002; Lööf, 2004; Flannery and 
Ragan, 2006).  
According to Pecking Order Theory, in the presence of 
problems of information asymmetry, the firm’s capital 
structure decisions are made following a hierarchical 
order in choosing sources of finance. The firm does not 
seek an optimal capital structure and its current 
capital structure reflects the financing needs found in 
previous periods (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 
1984). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) approached the capital 
structure decisions based on the agency costs. Firms 
incur two types of agency costs: costs associated with 
the presence of debt in capital structure, and the costs 
associated with the external equity investors (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). Initially, the total agency costs 
decrease, and after certain level of external equity in 
capital structure, they increase. The total agency costs 
become minimal at a certain level of external equity. 
Thus, Agency Theory defends the existence of an 
optimal capital structure. 
In accordance with the approach of Market Timing, 
the firm’s capital structure is the accumulated result of 
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past attempts to time the stock market by its managers 
(Baker and Wurgler, 2002). In this context, managers 
issue shares, when they perceive that the firm’s shares 
are overvalued by the market, and they buy back 
shares, when they consider the shares are undervalued.  
This study, seeking to contribute to knowledge 
regarding the capital structure puzzle as stated by 
Myers (1984), intends to analyze the influence of firms’ 
specific factors on capital structure, aiming to 
determine whether capital structure theories are 
mutually exclusive in explaining the capital structure 
decisions of European and U.S. listed firms. In  this 
context, the finance theories considered are: Static 
Trade-off, Dynamic Trade-Off, Agency, Pecking Order 
and Market Timing Theories. 
To reach the main objective of this study, we consider 
a research sample of 659 firms that, according to their 
nationality, are divided as follows: 92 firms located in 
Germany, 78 in Spain, 95 in France, 91 in Italy, 76 in 
the Netherlands, 45 in Portugal, 91 in the United 
Kingdom and 91 in the United States. The data is 
collected from AMADEUS database, for the period 
between 1996 and 2007. As method of estimation, we 
use panel data models, namely the GMM System (1998) 
and LSDVC (2005) dynamic estimators. The results 
obtained show, for listed firms in Europe and U.S., the 
existence of a negative relationship between profit-
ability and debt, and a negative relationship between 
liquidity and debt. These results suggest that 
European and U.S. listed firms’ capital structure 
decisions seem to be in accordance with the 
assumptions of Pecking Order Theory. 
In addition, the results suggest that European and U.S. 
listed firms adjust the current level of debt seeking to 
reach the target debt ratio; and that those firms adopt 
a financing behaviour according to the predictions of 
Dynamic Trade-Off Theory. However, the speeds of 
adjustment differ among firms from the various 
countries, reflecting the differences in transaction costs 
incurred by firms of the different countries. The results 
of the current study suggest that listed firms in Europe 
and in U.S. prefer retained earnings than external 
sources of finance. Furthermore, those firms have 
different speeds  of adjustment which suggest different 
transaction costs for firms in different countries. 
Probably, the existence of benefits and costs associated 
with firms´ transactions in their local markets 
contributes to explaining the different speeds of 
adjustment of firms in Europe and U.S.. Therefore, 
capital structure decisions are explained by not only 
firm-specific characteristics, but also by economic and 
institutional factors of the countries where firms 
operate. 
The article is structured as follows, after this 
introduction in Section 1: Section 2 presents firms’ 
specific factors determining capital structure decisions; 
Section 3 presents the methodology used in the study; 
Section 4 presents the results obtained; Section 5 goes 
on to interpret and discuss the results; and Section 6 
concludes the study. 
Firms’ Specific Factors Determinants of 
Capital Structure 
According to Harris and Raviv (1991), the level of 
fixed assets, tax savings, growth opportunities and 
business size are firms’ specific factors related 
positively to the level of debt. Those authors also 
stated that the firm’s specific factors relating to risk, 
likelihood of bankruptcy, profitability and specific 
nature of the product are negatively related to the 
firm’s level of debt. Based on a review of previous 
studies, Frank and Goyal (2008) highlighted size, asset 
tangibility, growth opportunities and profitability as 
determinants with a statistically significant impact on 
the level of debt.  
We go on to present firms’ specific factors as potential 
determinants of capital structure in European and U.S. 
firms, in the framework of Static Trade-off, Dynamic 
Trade-Off, Agency, Pecking Order and Market Timing 
theories. 
Asset Tangibility 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), a firm with 
a high level of tangible assets has the capacity to 
provide collateral, lessening the risk of failing to meet 
commitments to creditors. Therefore, in the presence 
of a large proportion of tangible assets, a high level of 
debt can be expected, since in the case of firm 
bankruptcy, tangible assets guarantee creditors that 
the debt will be repaid (Gaud,Jani, Hoesli  and Bender, 
2005). Consequently, the agency costs associated with 
the debt are lower for firms with higher levels of 
tangible assets.  
From the perspective of Agency Theory, Harris and 
Raviv (1990) based on agency problems between 
managers and shareholders, suggested that firms with 
a greater volume of tangible assets should present a 
higher level of debt, with the aim of disciplining 
managers’ actions. In contrast, Gaud, Jani, Hoesli and 
Bender (2005) argued that the disciplining role of debt 
should occur, mostly, in firms with low levels of 
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tangible assets, given that for firms in this situation, it 
becomes difficult to monitor their managers’ 
behaviour. It is of note that numerous empirical 
studies (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Graham,Lemmon, 
and Schallheim,  1998; Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; 
Kremp,Stöes, and Gerdesmeier, 1999; Hovakimian, 
Opler and Titman, 2001; Baker and Wurgler, 2002; 
Frank and Goyal, 2003; Korajczyk and Levy, 2003; 
Gaud,Jani, Hoesli  and Bender, 2005; Antoniou,Guney, 
and Paudyal,  2008) on the determinants of capital 
structure, conclude that firms with higher levels of 
tangible assets tend to present higher levels of debt, 
i.e., those empirical studies show evidence of a 
positive relationship between asset tangibility and 
debt. However, Titman and Wessels (1988) obtained 
inconclusive results on the relationship between 
tangible assets and debt. Berger and Udell  (1994) 
argued that for firms with a close relationship with 
creditors, there is possibly less need for tangible assets 
to be used as collateral. Close relationships of firm 
with creditors seem to be a way of substituting the 
collateral required by creditors to firm. 
In this study, according to the studies of Titman and 
Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Fama 
and French (2002), the variable of asset tangibility, 
considering a determinant of capital structure, will be 
calculated on the basis of the ratio of tangible fixed 
assets to total assets (Table A1). 
Intangible Assets 
Myers (1984) argued that firms with assets unsuitable 
for use as guarantees (i.e., intangible assets) show less 
debt than firms possessing a higher level of tangible 
assets. Firms with high levels of intangible assets have 
lower levels of debt, because intangible assets are not 
appropriate as the collaterals demanded by creditors. 
Therefore, firms with higher levels of intangible assets 
are expected to resort more to external equity rather 
than debt, as confirmed by various empirical studies 
(Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; 
Gaud,Jani, Hoesli and Bender, 2005). 
As in the studies by Titman and Wessels (1998) and 
Giannetti (2003), in the current study, the variable of 
intangible assets will be measured by the relationship 
between intangible fixed assets and total assets (Table 
A1). 
Growth 
Static Trade-Off Theory predicts a negative relation-
ship between firm growth and debt. Firms with high 
level of growth can face problems of underinvestment, 
i.e., firms reject investment projects with a positive net 
present value (NPV) (Myers, 1977). The problem of 
underinvestment, according to Myers (1977), emerges, 
because firms with greater risk have not incentives to 
invest in projects with a positive NPV, since share-
holders bear almost all the cost of the project, and only 
receive a fraction of the increased firm value, a part of 
which goes to bondholders/creditors.  
A higher level of growth contributes to the problem of 
asset substitution (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), 
implyinga greater debt cost for firms with high level of 
growth. In fact, it is easier for managers/shareholders 
to increase the risk of investment projects, and more 
difficult for creditors to monitor the changes in risk 
(Frank and Goyal, 2008). 
Agency Theory forecasts a negative relationship between 
firm growth and debt as a function of underinvest-
ment and agency costs associated with free cash flow 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977). The agency 
problems associated with free cash flow are less severe 
for firms presenting a high level of growth, thus these 
firms will need less debt to discipline managers’ 
behaviour (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Pecking Order Theory suggests a positive relationship 
between growth and debt, given that debt increases as 
a function of the insufficiency of the retained profits to 
fund the firm´s investment opportunities. Furthermore, 
Myers (1984) suggested that firms with high levels of 
debt avoid issuing shares as a first source of external 
financing. Firms create a financial slack, seeking to 
assure debt capacity to finance their future investment 
opportunities. This being so, according to this 
approach, for constant levels of profitability, a higher 
level of debt is expected in firms with high level of 
growth, which is supported by the studies of Titman 
and Wessels (1988), Smith and Watts (1992), 
Hovakimian,Opler and Titman (2001), Fama and 
French (2002) and Frank and Goyal (2003).  
As in the studies by De Jong, Kabir, and Nguyen 
(2007), in this study, firm growth is measured by the 
ratio of the variation of total assets to total assets 
(Table A1). 
Market-to-Book Ratio (MTB) 
Hovakimian,Opler and Titman (2001) stated that a 
significant increase in the shares price is, generally, 
associated with greater level of growth opportunities, 
implying a lower debt ratio. In analyzing the 
relationship between the Market-to-Book (MTB) ratio 
and debt, Welch (2004) concluded that the volatility of 
www.seipub.org/rae                                                                                           Research and Applications in Economics Volume 2, 2014 
4   
the shares price originate persistent effects on firms’ 
capital structure, considering that firms do not 
immediately reflect the variations of the shares price 
on their capital structure. In turn, Bie and Haan (2004) 
also analyzed the effects of Market Timing Theory on 
the capital structure of a sample of German non-
financial firms, in the period between 1983 and 1997, 
and found a negative relationship between share price 
and debt, concluding that firms issue shares when the 
share price was seen to increase. 
Stein (1996) argued that managers can time the stock 
market to maximize the current shareholders’ wealth. 
Market Timing Theory has, also, found support in the 
work of Bake and Wurgler (2002). These last-named 
authors suggested that a firm´s capital structure is the 
cumulative result of past attempts by its managers to 
time the stock market, given that firms issue shares, 
when they perceive that the shares are overvalued. 
Manager buy back the shares, when they consider that 
the shares are undervalued by the market. Baker and 
Wurgler (2002) related firm debt to the practice of 
Market Timing in the stock market, using the MTB 
ratio for that purpose, suggesting this variable as a 
measure of growth opportunities or a measure of 
share assessment error analysis, by economic agents 
intervening in the stock market. 
Following Baker and Wurgler (2002), in this study the 
MTB variable is defined as being the quotient between 
the market value of total assets and the book value of 
total assets (Table A1). 
Size 
Titman and Wessels (1988), adopting the perspective 
of Static Trade-Off Theory, suggested that the influ-
ence of the firm size variable on debt can occur in two 
ways: i) large firms increase their capacity of debt by 
following a strategy of diversifying areas of business, 
allowing them to reduce the volatility of their cash 
flows, diminishing the risk of bankruptcy; ii) for large 
firms, the fixed costs of bankruptcy are proportionate-
ly inferior than for small firms, contributing to a 
lowerdebt cost for the former. It should, also, be 
mentioned that Warner (1977), Ferri and Jones (1979) 
and Ang,Chua and  Macconell  (1982) suggested that 
small firms face greater financial difficulties than large 
ones, since the latter have a greater capacity for debt, 
considering their higher credit ratings, thus obtaining 
lower interest rates on loans. From the perspective of 
Static Trade-Off Theory, firms with a diversified 
business portfolio, and a good reputation in credit 
markets, have lower costs of debt, and as such, this 
perspective foresees a positive relationship between 
firm size and debt. Therefore, Static Trade-Off Theory 
predicts a positive relationship between firm size and 
debt. This result is obtained in various empirical 
studies (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Graham,Lemmon 
and Schallheim, 1998; Booth,Aivazian, Demirgue-Kunt 
and Maksimovic, 2001; Hovakimian,Opler and Titman, 
2001; Fama and French, 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2003; 
Korajczyk and Levy, 2003; Antoniou,Guney and 
Paudyal, 2008).  
Nevertheless, according to Pecking Order Theory, the 
expected sign of the relationship between firm size 
and debt can present ambiguous results, due to the 
fact that large firms show a greater preference for 
external sources of finance, either through recourse to 
bank debt or through issuing bonds or shares. Large 
firms make available information about their activities, 
reducing the problems of information asymmetry with 
the various agents outside of the firm. Consequently, 
from the perspective of Pecking Order Theory, the 
expected sign of the relationship between firm size 
and debt is not clearly defined. When the firm retained 
earnings are insufficient, on the one hand, a negative 
relationship is expected between firm size and debt if 
large firms choose to issue debt. On the other hand, a 
positive relationship is expected between those two 
variables if large firms choose external financing to 
fund their needs.However, the results of the studies by 
Kremp,Stöes, and Gerdesmeier (1999) and Ozkan, 
(2001) are inconclusive about the relationship between 
firm size and debt. 
In accordance with Rajan and Zingales (1995) and 
Pereira and Ferreira (2011), in this study the firm size 
variable is measured based on the natural logarithm of 
firms’ turnover (Table A1). 
Tax Rate 
One of the most important aspects of Static Trade-Off 
Theory is related to debt tax shields, which depends 
on two factors: i) the amount of debt used by the firm 
and ii) the firm’s tax rate. Therefore, an increase in the 
tax rate, with the level of debt remaining constant, 
implies increased debt tax shields for the firm, 
suggesting a positive relationship between tax rate 
and debt. Graham,Lemmon and Schallheim (1998), 
Graham (1999) and Graham and Harvey (2001) identify 
a positive relationship between tax rate and debt.  
As in Graham, Lemmon  and Schallheim (1998), 
Graham (1999), Graham and Harvey (2001), in this 
study the tax rate variable is calculated by the ratio of 
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the difference between the profits before tax and the 
value of net profits in the period to profits before tax 
(Table A1). 
Risk 
Regarding the risk variable, Static Trade-Off Theory 
suggests that high volatility of net profits increases the 
risk of the firm not being able to pay off the debt, 
implying greater financial difficulties. Consequently, 
higher volatility of net profits implies a lower level of 
firm debt. Firms with a high volatility of net profits 
can create “an extra capacity for debt”, seeking to 
protect themselves of the effects of the future 
variations in profits. According to De Jong,Kabir, and 
Nguyen (2007), a negative relationship can be 
expected between risk and firm debt.  
As in various studies, Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984), 
Titman and Wessels (1988), Booth,Aivazian, Demirgue-
Kunt, and Maksimovic (2001), Giannetti (2002) and De 
Jong, Kabir, and Nguyen (2007), here the risk variable 
is measured by the standard deviation of operational 
results over total assets (Table A1). 
Profitability 
Pecking Order Theory suggests a negative relationship 
between profitability and debt, as the existence of 
problems of information asymmetry implies selection 
of sources of finance according to a hierarchical order 
of preferences: in the first place, firms prefer to resort 
to internally generated funds rather than external 
sources of finance, since this implies relatively lower 
costs. However, when internal financing is insufficient, 
and the capacity for debt is exhausted, firms issue 
shares to finance the future investment opportunities 
(Myers, 1984). 
Static Trade-Off Theory assumes a positive relationship 
between profitability and firm debt, because debt tax 
shields allow firms with higher levels of profitability 
to pay less tax on income (Frank and Goyal, 2008). 
Agency Theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Easterbrook, 
1984; Jensen, 1986) also suggests a positive relation-
ship between profitability and debt, given that firms 
should have higher levels of debt to discipline their 
managers’ behaviour to alleviate free cash flow 
problems.  
Various empirical studies (Titman and Wessels, 1988; 
Harris and Raviv, 1991; Smith and Watts, 1992; Rajan 
and Zingales, 1995; Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; 
Booth,Aivazian, Demirgue-Kunt and Maksimovic, 
2001; Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2003; 
Korajczyk and Levy, 2003; Antoniou,Guney, and 
Paudyal, 2008) identify a negative relationship 
between profitability and firm debt. This result is 
consistent with Pecking Order Theory, and inconsis-
tent with Static Trade-Off Theory and Agency Theory. 
However, Fama and French (2002) obtain a positive, 
and statistically significant, relationship between 
profitability and debt, supporting the principles of 
Static Trade-Off and Agency Theories.  
Similarly to the studies by Titman and Wessels (1998), 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), Baker and Wurgler (2002), 
and Pereira and Ferreira (2011), in this study 
profitability is measured based on the ratio of 
operational cash flow to total assets (Table A1). 
Financial Flexibility 
According to Pecking Order Theory, firms can create a 
financial slack to implement investment projects with 
a positive NPV, without issuing debt or shares, and 
therefore, this theoretical perspective suggests there 
should be a negative relationship between financial 
flexibility and debt. In turn, Static Trade-Off Theory 
suggests no relationship between these two variables, 
since firms do not need to maintain any excess of 
financial funds to manage their operational cycle 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984).  
Following the study by Ferreira and Vilela (2004), in 
this study the proxy of financial flexibility corresponds 
to the ratio of cash value and cash equivalents to total 
current assets (Table A1). 
Liquidity 
According to Ozkan (2001) the effect of liquidity on 
debt is ambiguous. On the one hand, firms, with high 
levels of liquidity, can have higher levels of debt due 
to the greater ability to fulfill their short-term 
commitments with creditors, within the respective 
dates (Ozkan, 2001). Therefore, a positive relationship 
is forecast between liquidity levels and debt. On the 
other hand, firms with higher levels of liquidity can 
use the corresponding assets to finance their 
investment. This financing behaviour is in agreement 
with the principles of Pecking Order Theory, and 
consequently a negative relationship is expected 
between liquidity and debt (Ozkan, 2001). Liu and Ren 
(2009) for Chinese listed firms, Eriotos,Dimitrios and 
Zoe (2007) for Greek listed firms identify a negative 
relationship between liquidity and debt. As in  the 
study by Ozkan (2001) and De Jong, Kabir, and 
Nguyen (2007), we consider the ratio of current assets 
to current liabilities as a proxy of the liquidity variable 
www.seipub.org/rae                                                                                           Research and Applications in Economics Volume 2, 2014 
6   
(Table A1). 
Target Debt Ratio and Speed of Adjustment 
According to Dynamic Trade-Off Theory firms adjust 
the current level of debt towards the target debt ratio. 
Therefore, firms that have a high level of current debt 
reduce their debt ratio, in the subsequent periods. 
Firms that verify low level of current debt increase 
their debt ratio, in subsequent periods. Furthermore, 
this theoretical perspective suggests that the costs of 
adjustment influence the speed of adjustment of the 
current level of debt towards the target debt ratio 
(Frank and Goyal, 2008).  Various empirical studies 
show disagreement regarding the speed of adjustment 
of current debt towards the target debt ratio. Fama 
and French (2002) conclude that the speed of 
adjustment is between 17% and 10% for US firms that 
distribute dividends, and between 15% and 18% for 
firms that do not. Nevertheless, the results obtained by 
Leary and Roberts (2005) and Alti (2006) show that US 
firms adjust quickly the current debt ratio towards the 
target debt ratio. Leary and Roberts (2005) conclude 
that transaction costs are potentially important in 
explaining the firms’ capital structure decisions and 
they can imply different patterns of variation in firms’ 
levels of debt. Antoniou,Guney, and Paudyal   (2008), 
in their study regarding G5 countries (France, 
Germany, Japan – bank oriented economies; United 
Kingdom and U.S - capital market oriented economies) 
conclude that the speeds of adjustment towards the 
target debt ratio, aside from the firm -specific factors, 
are influenced by the economic and institutional 
factors. Corroborating these results, Oztekin and 
Flannery (2012) in their international study, in 37 
countries, conclude that adjustment speeds vary 
considerably with international differences in financial 
system features.  
Methodology 
Database 
This study uses the AMADEUS database, obtaining a 
total of 750 firms, using as criteria1 very large firms 
                                                                 
1 On Amadeus database, firms are considered to be very 
large when they match at least one of the following 
conditions: Operating Revenue>= 100 million EUR (130 
million USD); Total assets >= 200 million EUR (260 million 
USD); Employees>=1,000; Firms on Amadeus are considered 
to be large when they match at least one of the following 
conditions: Operating Revenue >= 10 million EUR (13 million 
USD); Total assets >= 20 million EUR (26 million USD); 
Employees >= 150.  
and large firms; national firms; non-financial firms; 
and listed firms. 
Similarly to the procedure used by De Jong, Kabir, and 
Nguyen (2007), firstly, firms present in the sample 
were required to have data available for at least 3 
years in the period of analysis.  
Secondly, alternative sources were used to collect data 
lacking in the AMADEUS database, namely resorting 
to accounting reports for the firms studied. Therefore, 
in this stage of the process of defining the sample, we 
eliminate firms, for which information was not 
available about all the variables, regarding the specific 
factors considered as determinants of firms ‘capital 
structure, for  the period of analysis between 1996 and 
2007.The second stage for obtaining the research 
sample, was begun with a total of 750 listed firms from 
8 countries and, due to the lack of data for some 
variables, 91 firms were eliminated. The final sample is 
composed by 659 firms, which according to their 
nationality, are divided up as follows: 92 German, 78 
Spanish, 95 French, 91 Italian, 76 Dutch, 45 Portuguese, 
91 British and 91 U.S.. 
Estimation Methods 
Static panel models do not allow analysis of the 
possible dynamics existing in firms’ capital structure 
decisions. Seeking to test Dynamic Trade-Off Theory, 
it becomes necessary to consider that firms define a 
target debt ratio. 
Marsh (1982) and Jalilvand and Harris (1984) 
suggested that determining the target level of debt 
should be based on the average of historical values of 
debt. However, for Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), 
this methodology has two limitations, as firstly it 
becomes necessary to use a database with a significant 
number of periods, and secondly, it is difficult to 
justify that target level of debt remains constant over a 
significant number of successive periods. Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999) suggest that target debt ratio 
depends on firms’ specific characteristics. Similarly to 
the studies made by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), 
De Miguel and Pindado (2001), Ozkan (2001), Fama 
and French (2002) and Gaud,Jani, Hoesli  and Bender 
(2005), in the current study, we consider the target 
debt ratio as depending on the firm’s specific 
characteristics.  
Determination of the target debt ratio, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡∗  , is based 
on the model of partial adjustment, and it is a linear 
function of the various determinants 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡,  and of the 
error term, ,i tε , expressed as follows: 
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𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡∗ = 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡𝜅𝜅 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡with = 1, … ,𝑁𝑁 ; 𝑡𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇𝑇       (1) 
where:𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡∗  = target debt ratio. 
Nevertheless, the imperfections of the capital market, 
namely the existence of transaction costs, restrain 
firms, in obtaining a complete adjustment of debt from 
one period to the next. These costs, which can be 
originated by frictions in the capital market and 
random events, constrain firms in their adjustment of 
the current debt ratio towards the target debt ratio. 
Consequently, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡∗  is not directly observable due to 
the presence of transaction costs, and so economic 
agents can only observe the current value of 
debt (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡).The relationship between 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡∗  and 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡  
can be expressed as follows: 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 .𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝛼𝛼�𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡∗ − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1�           (2) 
where:𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 = current level of debt in period t; 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1  
= current level of debt in period t-1;𝛼𝛼 = adjustment of 
current level of debt towards the target debt ratio. 
According to the above equation, alteration to the 
current level of   debt is a fraction 𝛼𝛼 of the target debt 
ratio for that same period, and the value of 𝛼𝛼  is 
proportional to firms’ capacity to adjust their current 
level of debt towards their target debt ratio.Solving 
equation (2) to the order of 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 , the present level of 
debt can be defined as follows: 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡∗                (3 ) 
The adjustment coefficient 𝛼𝛼 varies between zero and 
one (0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 1) , i .e., 𝛼𝛼  refers to the coefficient that 
allows the assessment of transaction costs. If 𝛼𝛼 = 1 , 
this implies 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡∗ , indicating that firms 
present nil transaction costs, and there is a complete  
adjustment of the current level of debt towards the 
target debt ratio. Consequently, the assumptions of 
Dynamic Trade-Off Theory are corroborated, given 
that the adjustment of debt is complete, and the firm 
reaches the target debt ratio. If  𝛼𝛼 = 0 , we have 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1, suggesting that transaction costs do 
not allow firms to adjust their current level of debt 
towards target debt ratio, and so the current level of 
debt is equal to that of the previous period. The lower 
the value of 𝛼𝛼, the higher the transaction costs borne 
by the firm, since those costs restrain the firm in the 
adjustment of current level of debt towards the target 
debt ratio.  
Substituting equation (1) in equation (3), the following 
equation is obtained: 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡𝜅𝜅 + 𝛼𝛼𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡          (4 ) 
Considering, 𝛾𝛾 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼) , 𝛽𝛽 = 𝛼𝛼𝜅𝜅  e 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  the 
equation can be rewritten, 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                  (5) 
The presence of a lagged variable as a regressive 
variable can create problems of autocorrelation, given 
that 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡  is a function of 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 ,  and 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡−1  is also a 
function of 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 , and consequently the estimators 
obtained can be biased and inconsistent. Thus, seeking 
to get over these difficulties and estimate the equation 
(1) this study used the following estimator GMM 
System (1998) by Blundell and Bond (1998) and LSDVC 
(2005) by Bruno (2005)2.  
Blundell and Bond (1998) conclude that when the 
dependent variable is persistent, and the number of 
periods is not very high, the GMM (1991) estimator is 
inefficient. In these circumstances, Blundell and Bond 
(1998) extend the GMM (1991) estimator, considering a 
system with variables at level and in first differences. 
Therefore, for the variables at level, the instruments 
are presented in first differences, and for the variables 
in first differences the instruments are presented at 
level. However, we do not use the GMM (1991) 
estimator in first differences because may imply 
biased estimations.  
To test the validity of instruments we use the Hansen 
test. The null hypothesis indicates the restrictions 
imposed by use of the instruments are valid, 
indicating the alternative hypothesis that the restric-
tions are not valid. By rejecting the null hypothesis, we 
conclude that the estimators are not robust.  
We test for the existence of first and second-order 
autocorrelation. The null hypothesis is that there is no 
autocorrelation, the alternative hypothesis being the 
existence of autocorrelation. By rejecting the null 
hypothesis of non-existence of second-order auto-
correlation, we conclude that the estimators are not 
robust.  
The Least Square Dummy Variable Corrected (LSDVC) 
dynamic estimator by Bruno (2005) is used to assess 
the robustness of the results. The LSDVC2 dynamic 
estimator proposed by Bruno (2005) was used with the 
aim of lessening possible bias obtained with estimations 
of the GMM System (1998) dynamic estimator.  
Results 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix  
The results of the descriptive statistics are presented in 
Table 1. 
                                                                 
2Use of the LSDVC (2005) dynamic estimator is advisable  up 
to 30 cross-sections as a means of testing the robustness of 
results obtained with the GMM system (1998) estimator. 
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TABLE 1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE FIRM´S SPECIFIC FACTORS DETERMINANTS 
Country 𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳 𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻 𝑰𝑰𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻 𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻 𝑺𝑺𝑰𝑰𝑺𝑺𝑳𝑳𝑺𝑺 𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻 𝑹𝑹𝑰𝑰𝑺𝑺 𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑻𝑻 𝑭𝑭𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑻𝑻 𝑳𝑳𝑰𝑰𝑳𝑳 𝑴𝑴𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴 Obs. 
































































































































































































The volatilities of the variables of debt, asset 
tangibility, firm size, profitability3, financial flexibility4, 
liquidity5and MTB ratio6are not to very high for the 
majority of European and U.S. firms, since the respec-
tive standard deviations are below the respective 
means. However, for the variables of intangible assets7, 
firm growth, tax rate and risk high volatility is 
observed, as the respective standard deviations are 
above the respective means.  
It is also of note that debt presents the lowest average 
value in U.S. firms (0.6), and the highest average value 
in French firms (0.71).  
Regarding the correlations between the variables 
studied, for Aivazian, Ge and Qiu (2005), when 
correlation coefficients between explanatory variables 
are not over 30%, the problem of endogeneity is not 
particularly relevant. In this study, only a few 
relationships are found to have values over 30%. 
However, these correlations, despite being over 30%, 
are not significantly high, and so the problem of 
                                                                 
3 The profitability variable  presents high volatility for 
German and US firms, since standard deviations are above 
the respective means observed. 
4The financial flexibility variable  presents high volatility for 
Portuguese firms, since the standard deviation is above the 
respective mean. 
5The liquidity variable  presents high volatility for German 
firms, since the respective standard deviations are above the 
respective means observed. 
6The MTB ratio shows high volatility for Italian and British 
firms, since the mean observed is below the respective 
standard deviations. 
7Volatility of the intangible assets variable is not particularly 
high for French and Portuguese firms, since the respective 
standard deviations are below the respective means 
observed. 
endogeneity between explanatory variables will not be 
particularly relevant in this study.8 
Dynamic Panel Models  
Table 2 presents the results obtained from applying 
the GMM System (1998) dynamic estimator. The results 
of the Hansen test indicate that we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis of validity of the instruments used.  
The second-order autocorrelation test, for the GMM 
System (1998) dynamic estimator, except to United 
States, indicates that we cannot reject the null hypo-
thesis of absence of autocorrelation.Except to United 
States, based on the validity of the instruments used 
and the absence of second-order autocorrelation, we 
can conclude that the results of the GMM System (1998) 
dynamic estimator are robust and open to interpreta-
tion. Bruno (2005) warns that using the GMM System 
(1998) estimator can lead to biased parameters. 
Therefore, we test robustness of the results using the 
estimator proposed by Bruno (2005), the LSDVC (2005), 
to estimate aconvergence regression of corrected fixed 
effects, which allows for correction of what is 
estimated with the GMM System (1998) estimator. The 
LSDVC (2005) results are presented in Table 3. 
We can state that the results obtained with the GMM 
System (1998) and LSDVC (2005) estimators are not 
similar regarding sign, magnitude and statistical 
significance of the estimated parameters. Therefore, 
we will take as a reference the results obtained with 
the GMM System (1998) and LSDVC (2005) estimators. 
The existence of second-order autocorrelation, with 
the GMM System (1998) estimator, regarding the 
estimations obtained for U.S. firms, implies that 
                                                                 
8Correlation matrixes are not presented but can be requested 
from the authors. 
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interpretation of the results obtained should be based 
on the estimations obtained with the LSDVC (2005) 
dynamic estimator. For European firms, we interpret 
the results obtained based on the GMM System (1998) 
estimator, since absence of second-order autocorrela-
tion is confirmed. From application of the GMM 
System (1998) estimator, it is identified a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between asset 
tangibility and debt in Dutch firms. For the firms of 
the remaining countries, the relationship between 
those two variables is not statistically significant. The 
results obtained with the GMM System (1998) 
estimator show a negative and statistically significant 
relationship between intangible assets and debt in 
Portuguese and British firms. Based on the LSDVC 
(2005) estimator, it is identified a  negative and 
statistically significant relationship between intangible 
assets and debt in U.S. firms. The results obtained on 
the basis of the GMM System (1998) dynamic 
estimator, indicate a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between firm growth and debt 
in German, Spanish, French and Italian firms.  
TABLE 2 DYNAMIC ESTIMATOR GMMSYSTEM (1998) 




















































































































































































































Notes: a) The Instruments are:�𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖.𝑡𝑡 −2 ,∑ ∆𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘=1 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 � for the equations in first differences; �∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 ,∑ 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘=1 � for equations in level. b)The test F 
has normal distribution N (0,1) and it tests the null hypothesis of non-significance as a whole of the parameters of the explanatory variables, 
against the null hypothesis of correlation between non-observable individual effects and the explanatory variables. c)The Hansen test has N(0,1) 
distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments used, against the alternative hypothesis of non-
validity of the instruments used. d) The m1 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of first order 
autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of existence of first order autocorrelation. e) The m2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and 
tests the null hypothesis of absence of second order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order 
autocorrelation.  f) S tandard deviations in brackets. g) a. significant at 10% level; b significant at 5% level;. c  significant at 1% level; h) 
Estimations include time dummy variables.  
TABLE 3 DYNAMIC ESTIMATOR LSDVC [GMM System (1998)]   



























































































































































































Notes:a) significant at 10% level; b) significant at 5% level; c) significant at 1% level; d) Estimations include time dummy variables.  
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In addition, we identify a negative and statistically 
significant relationship between firm growth and debt 
in British firms. However, we do not find a statistically 
significant relationship between firm growth and debt 
in Dutch and Portuguese firms. According to the 
results of the LSDVC (2005) estimator, there isa 
positive and statistically significant relationship 
between growth and debt in U.S. firms.  
Applying the GMM System (1998) estimator, we find a 
positive and statistically significant relationship 
between size and debt in German, Spanish and Dutch 
firms. Based on the application of the LSDVC (2005) 
estimator, we identify a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between size and debt in U.S. 
firms.  
The results obtained with the GMM System (1998) 
estimator indicate a negative and statistically 
significant relationship between tax rate and debt in 
Dutch firms. Moreover, the results show a positive 
and statistically significant relationship between those 
two variables, for British and German firms. However, 
the relationship between tax rate and debt is not 
statistically significant for Spanish, French, Italian, 
Portuguese and U.S. firms.  
The results obtained with the GMM System (1998) 
estimator indicate a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between risk and debt in 
Portuguese and British firms. However, for the firms 
in the remaining countries, the relationship between 
risk and debt is not statistically significant.  
The results in Table 2 show a negative and statistically 
relationship between profitability and debt in all 
European firms. On the basis of the application of the 
LSDVC (2005) estimator, we identify a negative and 
statistically significant relationship between profit-
ability and debt in U.S. firms (Table 3). 
Concerning the relationship between financial 
flexibility and debt, application of the GMM System 
(1998) estimator identified a negative and statistically 
significant relationship for German, Spanish and 
Dutch firms (Table 2). The results obtained with the 
LSDVC (2005) estimator show a negative and statisti-
cally relationship between financial flexibility and 
debt in U.S. firms (Table 3). 
Analysis of the results of the GMM System (1998) 
estimator, also, suggests a negative and statistically 
significant relationship between liquidity and debt in 
German, Spanish, French, Italian and Portuguese firms 
(Table 2). Application of the LSDVC (2005) estimator 
identifies a negative and statistically significant 
relationship between liquidity and debt in U.S. firms 
(Table 3).  
The results of the GMM System (1998) estimator and 
the LSDVC (2005) estimator allow us to conclude that 
the relationship between the MTB ratio and debt is not 
statistically significant for European and U.S. firms.  
The results obtained from applying theGMM System 
(1998) estimator and the LSDVC (2005) estimator 
indicate that the coefficient measuring the impact of 
debt of the previous period on debt of the current 
period is positive and statistically significant, for 
German, Spanish, French, Italian, Dutch, Portuguese 
and British firms (Table 2). The results of the LSDVC 
(2005) estimator show that U.S. firms adjust their 
current debt ratio towards target debt ratio (Table 3).  
The coefficient of adjustment of current level of debt 
towards target debt ratio varies between 0.201 in 
French firms and 0.745 in British firms. It is of note 
that the adjustment coefficient of French firms is 
relatively low, which can be justified by the high 
transaction costs borne by these firms. In turn, the 
adjustment coefficient of British firms is comparatively 
the highest. This result suggests that British firms bear 
lower transaction costs than the firms of the other 
European and US countries. These results are different 
from those ones obtained by Antoniou, Guney, and 
Paudyal (2008) and Oztekin and Flannery (2012), 
which have considered institutional and economic 
factors as possible determinants of firms’ capital 
structure decisions. Therefore, the differences 
regarding the speeds of adjustment identified in those 
studies and the results obtained for the current study 
are probably due to the fact that the current study 
does not consider the institutional factors that may 
contribute to different speeds of adjustment towards 
the firm´s target debt ratios. 
Discussion of the Results 
We now analyze the results obtained concerning the 
relationship between firms’ specific factors and the 
level of debt in European and U.S. firms, in the light of 
Static Trade-Off, Pecking Order, Market Timing and 
Dynamic Trade-Off Theories.  
The results obtained allow us to conclude that firm 
growth is a determinant with a positive influence on 
debt in German, French and Italian firms. However, in 
British firms, that relationship is negative and 
statistically significant. In addition, firm growth has a 
positive and significant influence on debt in U.S. firms. 
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These results suggest that some European and U.S. 
firms use debt to fund their needs associated with 
their growth. 
Those results contradict the principles of Static Trade-
Off Theory and those of Agency Theory, according to 
which firms with greater growth opportunities present 
greater risk, which increases the likelihood of 
bankruptcy and increases agency costs, therefore 
justifying a lower level of debt. However, that positive 
relationship between growth and debt is in accordance 
with Pecking Order Theory, which forecasts that firms 
will turn to debt to finance their growth, when they do 
not have sufficient internal funding. Therefore, the 
results suggest that some European firms, belonging 
to countries with a bank-based financial system (e.g. 
Germany, Spain and Italy), resort to debt to finance 
their growth, when retained profits are insufficient. 
In the United Kingdom, a country with a financial 
system based on the capital market, firms seem to 
adopt a financing behaviour contradicting the 
forecasts of Pecking Order Theory. Those firms do not 
appear to issue debt, possibly preferring to issue 
shares to finance their growth. On the contrary, firms 
in the U.S., a country with a financial system also 
based on the capital market, seem to adopt a  financing 
behavior, which agrees with Pecking Order Theory. In 
fact, the results suggest that those firms prefer to issue 
debt than to issue shares to fund their growth, when 
internal funding is insufficient. 
The relationship between profitability and debt is 
negative and statistically significant for all European 
and U.S. firms, suggesting that these firms follow 
Pecking Order Theory in their capital structure 
decisions. These results suggest that internal financing 
is preferred by firms, whatever the countries’ financial 
system. These results are in agreement with Frank and 
Goyal (2003), who concluded that large U.S. firms 
follow Pecking Order Theory, because they have a 
greater capacity to generate profits, avoiding the 
recourse to external financing to satisfy needs not met 
by retained profits. Also, Antoniou, Guney, and 
Paudyal (2008) identify a negative relationship 
between profitability and debt for all countries 
analyzed. These authors verify that France is the 
country, where profitability has a higher negative 
impact on debt. This is justified on the basis of the 
aversion of the French owners in losing firm´s control 
and independence, problems of asymmetric 
information, weaker protection of the creditors. These 
factors may explain the preference of firms for internal 
finance, and firms follow a hierarchy in selecting the 
firm´ finance sources, in  accordance with Pecking 
Order Theory.  
The determinant factor regarding financial flexibility 
has also a negative and significant relationship with 
debt in the case of German, Dutch and U.S. firms. This 
negative relationship suggests that firms with greater 
financial flexibility create a financial slack seeking to 
have a debt capacity to fund their future growth. This 
financing strategy is in agreement with Pecking Order 
Theory, according to which firms create a financial 
slack, so as to have the capacity to fund future 
investment projects (DeAngelo,Harry, Linda and 
Whited, 2011).  
Furthermore, the determinant factor of liquidity has a 
negative and significant relationship with debt in all 
European and U.S. firms. These results suggest that 
European and U.S. listed firms, with greater liquidity, 
carry out their investment through their internal 
financial resources, requiring lower levels of debt. 
These results are in accordance with the predictions of 
Pecking Order Theory. 
The relationship between the MTB ratio and debt is 
positive and statistically significant for Italian and 
Dutch firms. Therefore, these firms seem to adopt a 
financing strategy, which goes against the principles of 
Market Timing Theory. In fact, those firms with 
greater levels of MTB ratio have superior levels of debt, 
suggesting that firms with high level of growth 
opportunities issue debt, instead to issue shares to 
fund their needs. The relationship between the MTB 
ratio and the level of debt suggest that listed Italian 
and Dutch firms follow the assumptions of the 
Pecking Order Theory, in  their capital structure 
decisions. 
Nevertheless, for firms in the other countries analyzed, 
the relationship between the MTB ratio and the level 
of debt is not statistically significant. In this study, the 
results obtained for the relationship between the MTB 
ratio and debt, suggest that Market Timing Theory is 
not followed by European and U.S. listed firms in their 
capital structure decisions. 
Regarding Dynamic Trade-Off Theory, we verify that 
Portuguese, British, U.S., Dutch and Italian firms are 
the ones with greater adjustment of current debt ratio 
towards the target debt ratio. Therefore, these firms 
seem to bear lower transaction costs, making a quicker 
adjustment of their current level of debt towards their 
target debt ratios.  
Spanish, German and French firms show less 
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adjustment of current level of debt towards the target 
debt ratio, probably due to the higher transaction costs, 
which those firms incur with the financial transactions. 
Therefore, for the firms in France, Germany, and Spain, 
the costs of financial imbalance appear to be lower 
than the transaction costs. The results regarding the 
speeds of adjustment obtained in the current study 
differ from the results of Antoniou,Guney, and 
Paudyal (2008) and Oztekin and Flannery (2012). 
Antoniou,Guney, and Paudyal  (2008) conclude that 
the speeds of adjustment towards the target debt ratio, 
aside from the firm-specific factors, are influenced by 
the economic and institutional factors. Oztekin and 
Flannery (2012) study the behavior of firms in 37 
countries regarding the target debt ratio and the 
adjustment speeds. These authors conclude that 
country’s legal and financial institutions significantly 
affect the adjustment speeds, which varies with 
international differences in important financial system 
features. 
Conclusion 
The objective of this study is to analyze the influence 
of firms’ specific factors on capital structure, seeking 
to verify if Static Trade-Off, Dynamic Trade-Off, 
Agency, Pecking Order and Market Timing Theories 
are not mutually exclusive, in explaining the capital 
structure decisions of European and U.S. listed firms. 
To reach this objective, data were collected for the 
period between 1996 and 2007, for a sample of 659 
firms located in different European countries and the 
U.S.: 92 firms located in Germany, 78 in Spain, 95 in 
France, 91 in Italy, 76 in the Netherlands, 45 in 
Portugal, and 91 in the United Kingdom and 91 in the 
United States.  
As estimation methods, we use panel data estimators, 
namely the GMM System (1998) and LSDVC (2005) 
dynamic estimators. 
The results show that theories on capital structure 
decisions, namely Agency, Static Trade-Off, Pecking 
Order and Dynamic Trade-Off Theories, are 
complementary in explaining the financing behaviour 
of European and U.S. listed firms.  
Pecking Order Theory seems to be followed by 
European and U.S. listed firms, considering the 
negative relationship between profitability and debt, 
and the negative relationship between liquidity and 
debt. However, firms also follow Dynamic Trade-Off 
Theory, seeking to adjust the current level of debt 
towards the target debt ratio, albeit with different 
levels of adjustment, reflecting differences in 
transaction costs borne by the firms in the different 
countries. The fact that Britain and the U.S. have a 
financial system based on the capital market does not 
seem to have repercussions for firms’ capital structure 
decisions, since the results suggest that firms in both 
countries prefer internal to external financing. This 
preference for internal financing is also found in 
European firms belonging to countries with a bank-
based financial system. In addition, British and U.S. 
firms present relatively quick adjustment of current 
debt ratio towards target debt ratio. These results 
suggest that British and U.S. listed firms bear lower 
transaction costs in comparison with the firms of the 
remaining countries. 
In general, the results show that theories on capital 
structure decisions, namely Agency, Static Trade-Off, 
Pecking Order and Dynamic Trade- Off Theories, are 
complementary in explaining the financing behaviour 
of European and U.S. listed firms.  
As limitations of this study, we can mention the 
absence of variables relating to countries’ specific 
factors which can contribute to determining the capital 
structure of European and U.S. firms. For future 
research, we suggest the inclusion of the variables 
regarding the countries’ specific factors which 
together with the variables of firms’ specific factors 
could contribute to deepening knowledge on the 
subject of capital structure decisions. 
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Appendix A 
TABLE A1DEFINITION OF FIRM-SPECIFIC FACTORS 
Variable Designation Definition 
Debt LEV   Total Net Assets− Equity
Total Net  Assets  
Asset Tangibility TANG Tangible Assets
Total Net Assets 
Asset Tangibility INTANG Intangibility Assets
 Total Net Assets  
Growth GA otal Net TAssetst −Net Total Assetst−1
Total Net Assets  
S ize SIZES ln(Turnover) 
Tax rate TAX 
Earnings before taxes− Net earnings
Earnings before taxes  
Risk RIS Standard deviation of earnings
Total Net Assets  
Profitability ROA   Operational cash flow
Total Net  Assets  
Financial flexibility FLEX Cash value and cash equivalents
Current Assets  
Liquidity LIQ Current Assets
Current liabilities 
Market-to-Book Ratio MTB  Market value of Total Assets
Book value of Total Assets  
 
